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I. INTRODUCrION
The cost of expanding Florida's over-crowded urban traffic ways is
skyrocketing. The Florida Department of Transportation's ("FDOT") actual
total expenditure for right of way production and eminent domain litigation
for June 1994 through May 1995 was $271.1 million,' up from $243.5
million the previous year.2 According to these figures, $166.1 million was
spent for production costs, including purchasing right of way and paying
severance and business damages to landowners and tenants.3 An additional
$105 million was spent litigating FDOT's takings state-wide.4 One writer
anticipates that over the next ten years, Florida will spend $44.3 billion to
1. Figures provided by the Cost Management Systems Department, State of Florida
Department of Transportation, District IV, June 9, 1995 [hereinafter Costs]. During the first
11 months of fiscal year 1994-1995, i.e., June 1994 through May 1995, Florida Department
of Transportation District IV, encompassing Broward, Palm Beach, Martin, and St. Lucie
Counties, spent a total of $22.9 million, compared to $64.3 million spent by District VI,
comprised of only Dade County.
2. See Erik Milstone, Roadblock, FLA. TREND, Mar. 1995, at 56, 59 (citing statistics
provided by the Center for Urban Transportation Research in Tampa, Florida).
3. See Costs, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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expand its roadway system.5 This estimate is $9 billion more than the state
will have available at current tax rates.6 Faced with the challenge of
balancing Florida's constitutional guarantee of "full compensation"7 against
a rapidly expanding eminent domain program and its increasing cost, the
Florida Legislature has taken steps to decrease the state's eminent domain
litigation exposure.8 Florida's courts, however, have been reluctant to
follow the legislature's lead.
One of the many factors contributing to the increase in state-wide right
of way costs is environmental contamination. Environmental contamination
takes many forms including asbestos, urea-formaldehyde foam insulation,
lead in drinking water, and petroleum hydrocarbon.9 The Federal Highway
Administration ("FHWA"), which contributes up to ninety percent of the
funds spent by FDOT to revamp its overburdened state roads, often requires
FDOT to clean up contamination prior to construction of federally-funded
state roadways.1" This cost traditionally has been paid by the FDOT and
the FHWA. The cost of clean-up, however, ultimately falls on the taxpayer.
5. See Milstone, supra note 2, at 60.
6. id.
7. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a), which states that "[n]o private property shall be taken
except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or
secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner." See also Dade
County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950) (stating that test for full compensation is not
met if landowner is required to pay attorney fees and costs out of damages awarded for value
of property taken).
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1995) (restructuring attorney's fees awarded in
eminent domain cases and generally limiting such awards to percentage of benefit obtained
for condemnee/client); see also FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1995).
9. See generally James R. Arnold, The Appraisal and Valuation of Contaminated
Properties, C643 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 405 (1991), available in WL, TP-ALL Directory, ALI-ABA
Database; Vincent D'Elia & Catherine M. Ward, The Valuation of Contaminated Property,
111 BANKING L.J. 350 (1994); John D. Dorchester, Jr., Environmental Pollution: Valuation
in a Changing World, 59 APPRAISAL J. 289 (1991); Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of
Contaminated Properties, 56 APPRAISAL J. 7 (1988) [hereinafter Patchin, Valuation]; William
B. Johnson, Annotation, State and Local Government Control of Pollution from Underground
Storage Tanks, 11 A.L.R.5TH 388 (1994); Gregor I. McGregor, Some Practical Suggestions
for Valuing Contaminated Real Estate, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 21, 1994, at 40, available
in WL, TP-ALL Directory, LP Database (providing general discussions on numerous types
of contamination).
10. Telephone Interview with Paul Lampley, District Contamination Impact Coordinator,
District IV, Florida Department of Transportation Environmental Management Office (June
26, 1995). Mr. Lampley also indicated that an agreement between the FDOT and the Florida
Highway Contractor's Association states that the FDOT will not send construction personnel
onto the right of way, if contaminated.
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In the recent first impression case of Finkelstein v. Department of
Transportation (Finkelstein I1)," the Supreme Court of Florida answered
a question of great public importance. The court answered in the affirmative
the question whether evidence of contamination was relevant to property
value. 2 The decision has the potential to slow cost increases attributable
to contamination because real estate appraisers may now consider the
negative effect of contamination on the value of property acquired in
eminent domain actions." The Finkelstein II decision also gives the FDOT
the authority to present evidence of contamination and its corresponding
negative effect on fair market value at trial. 4 Full compensation is linked
to an estimate of fair market value." Because fair market value may now
reflect the negative impact of on-site contamination, 6 it is possible that
FDOT could pay less for property negatively "stigmatized" by contami-
nation. In the end, FDOT's exercise of this newly-granted authority should
help to control a portion of Florida's rising eminent domain costs.
This comment examines the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida
in Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation. Part II presents the facts of
the case, the procedural history, and a summary of the supreme court
decision. Part III of this comment discusses the relevance of evidence of
contamination in eminent domain valuation proceedings and current
appraisal valuation methodology, 7 as a result of the Finkelstein II decision.
11. 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
12. Id. at 922.
13. IM at 924.
14. Id. at 925.
15. See generally FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(a) (1995) (giving ajury of twelve persons the
power to determine "the amount of compensation to be paid, which compensation shall
include... [t]he value of the property sought to be appropriated"). Additionally, Jackson-
ville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1958), states:
[w]e feel our constitutional provision for full compensation requires that the
courts determine the value of the property by taking into account all facts and
circumstances which bear a reasonable relationship to the loss occasioned the
owner by virtue of the taking of his property under the right of eminent domain.
Id. at 291.
16. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 922.
17. See id. at 923.
1996]
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II. FINKELSTEIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
A. Facts of the Case
In March 1990, the FDOT filed a petition to condemn Parcel 239, a
whole taking of an environmentally contaminated gasoline service station
located at Davie Boulevard and Interstate 95 in Fort Lauderdale, Broward
County, Florida, as a part of the Interstate 595 expansion project.1 The
parcel was owned by Ida Finkelstein and Alice Fox and was leased to
Tenneco Oil Company ("Tenneco").' 9 The petition stated a good faith
estimate of value for the property of $642,650.0 After the Order of
Taking hearing was held May 1, 1990, FDOT deposited $642,650 into the
registry of the court, and title to the property vested in the FDOT.21
Finkelstein and Fox answered the petition in May and June of 1990,
respectively, and no other pleadings were filed until April 3, 1992, when a
pretrial order setting the cause for trial was filed.22
Prior to December 1988, Tenneco discovered petroleum groundwater
contamination beneath the service station site.23 According to the supreme
court, Tenneco reported the contamination to the Department of Environ-
mental Regulation ("DER") 24 as encouraged by Florida law,25 and began
monitoring the contamination.26 The parties agreed that the DER had
determined the site was eligible for Florida's Early Detection Incentive
18. ld; State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein (Finkelstein 1), 629 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (certifying question to Supreme Court of Florida), review granted, 648
So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1994), aft'd, 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995); Amended Brief of Petitioners at
1, Finkelstein v. Department of Transp., 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995) (No. 83,308).
19. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 1, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
20. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d at 932; Petition, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No.
90-06563(19) (Fla. Broward County Ct. Mar. 1, 1990).
21. See Certificate of the Clerk, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(19)
(Fla. Broward County Ct. May 1, 1990); see also discussion infra note 185.
22. Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 932.
23. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 921, 923 (Fla. 1995).
24. Id. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation is now known as the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection.
25. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9)(b) (1995).
26. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 2, Finkelstein (No. 83,308). Subsequently, FDOT
investigated this matter and discovered that Tenneco, in fact, had not begun on-site
remediation; rather, it was the FDOT itself who had begun the clean-up. See Transcript of
Hearing on Remand at 29, Department of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-6563(19) (Fla.
Broward County Ct. October 9, 1995).
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("EDr') program.27  The EDI program encouraged early detection,
reporting, and clean-up of contamination from leaking petroleum storage
systems through state reimbursement of clean-up expense.28 Under the
EDI program, only qualified sites were eligible for reimbursement, not
qualified landowners. 29 Through a memorandum of understanding between
the DER and the FDOT, the FDOT became the beneficiary of the site's EDI
eligibility and state reimbursement of remediation costs. 30 Prior to the June
1992 trial, FDOT worked closely with the DER to quickly remediate the site
to meet FDOT's construction schedule for the road improvement project."
B. Procedural Background
On June 12, 1992, FDOT filed a motion in limine seeking a pretrial
determination of the admissibility of evidence that the property taken was
contaminated with petroleum hydrocarbon and the cost of remediation.32
27. Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 923.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9)(a)-(b), (12)(b); see also Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at
923; Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aft'd, 656 So. 2d 921
(1995); Puckett Oil Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 549 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (determining eligibility for gasoline service station site under EDI program);
Commercial Coating Corp. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 548 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 560 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1990) (defining mineral spirits as
"petroleum product" under EDI statute to find site eligible for remediation cost reimburse-
ment); Amended Brief of Petitioners at 1-2, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Johnson, supra note
9, §§ 3-5, 13-15, at 402-12, 428-37.
Prior to June 1995, only sites with leaky underground storage tanks were eligible to
participate in the EDI program. FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9)(a)-(b), (12)(b). The majority of
sites with this contamination problem are gasoline service stations. Reforms to the problem-
laden EDI program limit eligibility for reimbursement of remediation costs to sites which
score more than 50 under a new ranking system. Prakash Gandhi, Critics: State Tank
Program Revised But Not Repaired, THE FLORIDA SPECIFIER, June 1995, at 1, 23. Of the
12,000 sites eligible for the EDI program, only 2300 score 50 or greater. Id. See S. 2578,
1995 Fla. Reg. Sess. (1995) for changes to Florida's EDI program.
29. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9) (1987).
30. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 2, Finkelstein (No. 83,308). FDOT filed for EDI
reimbursement on September 5, 1995, after the original application had been lost. Letter
from Paul A. Lampley, District Contamination Impact Coordinator, District IV Florida
Department of Transportation Environmental Management Office, to Charles Williams,
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement Section
(Sept. 5, 1995) (on file with author).
31. Id.; see also Interview with Linda Ferroli Nelson, Administrator of Eminent Domain,
District IV, Florida Department of Transportation, in Plantation, Fla. (June 20, 1995).
32. Finkelstein I1, 656 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1995); Petitioner's Motion in Limine, State
Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 12, 1992).
19961
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The FDOT took the position that evidence of contamination was relevant to
the issue of full compensation and should be admitted.33 The defendants
argued that the evidence was not relevant because remediation costs were
not fully ascertained at the time of trial and because the amount of the EDI
reimbursement was not determined. Following argument, the trial judge
denied the FDOT's motion," later confirming that counsel for the parties
would not be permitted to comment upon contamination during opening
statements.36 The FDOT then proffered the contamination and remediation
testimony of its environmental consultants, who were responsible for
assessing the contamination, designing a remediation plan, and implementing
the plan.37 The FDOT also proffered the testimony of its appraiser.3" In
sum, the FDOT contended that the testimony of its experts would have
established that: 1) the property was contaminated at the date of taking; 2)
remediation costs ranged between $750,000 and $800,000; 3) buyers, sellers,
and lending institutions routinely request contamination assessments of real
property; 4) banks are reluctant to finance "dirty" property or take such
property back in default; and 5) contamination "stigmatizes" real property
and affects the marketability and desirability of the property and would have
a negative effect on the value of the subject property of at least twenty to
twenty-five percent.39 Defendant's counsel objected to FDOT's proffer.'
The trial court sustained the objection.41
33. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 656 So. 2d
921 (Fla. 1995).
34. Il
35. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923; Trial Proceedings at 7, State Dep't of Transp. v.
Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 30, 1992).
36. Hearing on Petitioner's Motion in Limine at 13, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkel-
stein, No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 29, 1992).
37. Brief for Respondent at 2-4, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); see also Swift & Co. v.
Housing Auth., 106 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that trial court should
have allowed jury to do its duty after hearing testimony regarding possible zoning changes
and value of site as phosphate mine).
38. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 4, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Brief for Respondent
at 4-5, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Trial Proceedings at 2, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein,
No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 30, 1992).
39. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923; Brief for Respondent at 2-5, Finkelstein (No.
83,308); Petitioner's Motion in Limine, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-
06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 11, 1992).
40. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), af'd, 656 So. 2d
921 (Fla. 1995).
41. Id
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The case was tried as if the property were "clean" on the date of
valuation.42 At trial, the parties agreed that the value of the improvements
located on the subject site was $350,000. 4" The FDOT's appraiser testified
at trial that the land, as if it were clean on the date of deposit, had a value
of $300,000. a' The owner's appraiser testified that the land had a value of
$567,000.! 5 The range of testimony on full compensation ranged from
$650,000, according to the FDOT's estimate, to $917,000, by the owner's
estimate.46 All of the comparable sales used to estimate the site's value
were uncontaminated.47 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
landowners for $525,000 for the value of the land plus the stipulated
$350,000 for the improvements, a total award of $875,000.48 Final
judgment was entered in the amount of the verdict on July 27, 1992.!9 The
FDOT filed a notice of appeal on August 13, 1992.50
In Finkelstein I, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the
record and concluded that the proffered contamination, remediation, and
stigma evidence had been improperly excluded by the trial judge.5 ' Based
primarily on another case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida,52 the
district court held that evidence of contamination and cost of remediation
were relevant to the value of the property and that these issues should have
gone before the jury.53 The appellate court reversed the final judgment,
remanded the cause for a new trial on the valuation issues, and certified the
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great public impor-
tance.54
42. Iad
43. IU
44. Id.; Testimony of Edward N. Parker, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-
06563(19) (Fla. Broward County Ct. May 1, 1990).
45. Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 933.
46. Id.
47. IU
48. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1995); Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 933.
49. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 4, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Brief for Respondent
at 7, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
50. Brief for Respondent at 7, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
51. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d at 934-35.
52. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987) (stating
that "any factor, including public fear, which impacts on the market value of land taken for
a public purpose may be considered to explain the basis for an expert's valuation opinion").
53. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1995); Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 934.
54. Finkelstein A1, 656 So. 2d at 922. The lower court did not construct a certified
question for the supreme court. Instead, the supreme court had to "glean" the certified
question from record, as phrased by the parties. Id
1996]
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C. The Supreme Court of Florida Decision
Justice Wells, writing for the majority,55 began the opinion by
quashing that portion of the district court's ruling that reversed the trial
court's ruling that testimony concerning remediation costs was not
admissible.5 6 The court found from their review of the record that there
was no factual issue as to the contamination of the property, the liability for
the contamination, or the payment for the remediation costs under the EDI
program. 7 Based on the FDOT's statements that the purpose for the
remediation testimony was to show the basis for its expert valuation
opinion,58 the court held that the evidence of contamination and remedia-
tion costs was not relevant to the valuation of the subject site.59 The court,
however, limited this holding to the facts of this case where there was a
program for reimbursement of the remediation costs, such as EDIw The
court further declined to decide whether remediation costs would be relevant
in a valuation proceeding involving property for which reimbursement for
remediation costs was not available.61
The court next agreed "with the district court that evidence of the fact
that property is or has been contaminated is relevant to the market value of
property in an eminent domain valuation proceeding." 62 The court relied
on several sources to support its position. First, the court noted, based on
an eminent domain law treatise,63 that contamination can "stigmatize" a
property thereby creating a reduction in value resulting from the increased
risk associated with contaminated property.' Second, the court noted that
the issue of valuing contaminated property has been the subject of articles
by real estate appraisers, which recognize contamination as a factor that
55. Justice Wells delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Grimes,
Justices Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923-26. Justice
Anstead concurred specially with an opinion. Id. Justice Overton recused himself. Id.
56. Id. at 923.
57. Id-
58. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923; see also Brief for Respondent at 11, Finkelstein
(No. 83,308).
59. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id (citing 8 MELVIN A. REsKIN & PATRICK J. ROHAN, NIcHOLs' THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 14C.06[1] (1994)).
64. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
[Vol. 20
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experts consider in the valuation of property.' Finally, the court found its
decision to be consistent with two other cases66 holding that factors
affecting market value are relevant in valuation proceedings. 67
By analogizing to Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, the court
reasoned that if the fear of power lines was relevant to explain a decrease
in value to the property in Jennings, evidence of contamination was a
reasonable explanation for the decrease in value of the subject property.6
In a quote from Jennings,69 the court narrowed this reasoning by explaining
that valuation experts routinely rely on sales of comparable property when
valuing property.7" Thus, the court stated, the focus of opinion testimony
in a valuation proceeding must be value.7' With regard to contaminated
property, the court stated that "[e]vidence of contamination, because of its
prejudicial nature, should not be a feature of a valuation trial beyond what
is necessary to explain facts showing a reduction in value caused by
contamination."72
Returning to the facts of the case, the court recalled that the trial court
had limited the FDOT's proffer of evidence that the contamination stigma
reduced the property value by twenty to twenty-five percent.73 The court
then noted that at oral argument, the FDOT's counsel did not know whether
its appraisal expert based his opinion on comparable sales of other
contaminated property.74 The court pointed out that for an appraiser's
opinion of a reduction in market value to be admissible it must have a basis
65. Il The court specifically cites a recent article appearing in the Appraisal Journal.
See James A. Chalmers & Scott A. Roehr, Issues in the Valuation of Contaminated Property,
61 APPRAISAL J. 28 (1993), available in WL, TP-ALL Directory, JLR Database.
66. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987); see
also Department of Agric. & Consumer Serv. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1990) (stating that
fair market value is that on which willing buyers and sellers agree only when they both are
aware of all relevant facts regarding property at issue).
67. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
68. Id But see Chappell v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 458 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1995)
(holding that owner's testimony as to damages resulting to remainder property following
condemnation for high voltage power lines was inadmissible).
69. See Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 898 (stating that eminent domain valuation trials
"[typically... involve[] real property brokers or appraisers who give valuation testimony
based on, e.g., the current or potential use of the property in question, the population growth
and development of the surrounding area, and sales of similar property").
70. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924-25.
71. Id.; see also infra part HI.
72. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
73. Id.
74. IL
1996] 959
9
Sheridan: Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation: The Supreme Court of
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
in facts and data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of property
valuation.75 In addition, the court stated that such opinion testimony must
pass the evidentiary test set forth in section 90.705(2) of the Florida
Statutes.6  The court held that there "must be a factual basis through
evidence of sales of comparable contaminated property upon which to base
a determination that contamination has decreased the value of the proper-
ty."" The court took this reasoning one step further by stating that if no
evidence exists upon which a fact-finder could determine the decrease in
property value, then the landowner would be entitled to fair market value of
the property valued as uncontaminated." After assigning to the condemnor
the burden of proving decrease in value of contaminated property, the court
found that because the Finkelstein property was in the process of being
cleaned, it should be valued as if successfully cleaned on the date of
taking.79 In doing so, the court suggested that the FDOT's appraiser base
his opinion on sales of comparable properties which also have been
successfully cleaned."0
Finally, the court rejected the landowner's argument that because the
stigma of contamination is temporary, it should not be admissible.81
Relying on its previous discussion, the court concluded that if an expert's
opinion meets the evidentiary test described, then whether stigma is or is not
temporary would be addressed during direct and cross examination. 2
75. Id. Section 90.704 of the Florida Statutes provides:
[t]he facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by, or made known to, him at or before the trial. If the facts
or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support
the opinion expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1995).
76. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925. Section 90.705(2) of the Florida Statutes states:
[pirior to the witness giving his opinion, a party against whom the opinion or
inference is offered may conduct a voir dire examination of the witness directed
to the underlying facts or data for his opinion. If the party establishes prima
facie evidence that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion, the
opinions and inferences of the expert are inadmissible unless the party offering
the testimony establishes the underlying facts or data.
FLA. STAT. § 90.705(2) (1995).
77. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. lad
82. Finkelstein I1, 656 So. 2d at 925.
[Vol. 20
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In closing, the court declined to decide whether the FDOT's proffered
evidence was admissible because the trial court so severely limited the
proffer. 3  The court, however, repeated its holding that evidence of
contamination is relevant to market valuation and is admissible upon
meeting an adequate factual predicate. 4 This holding, however, was
further limited to the particular circumstances of this case, where the site
qualified for EDI reimbursement.8" Accordingly, the supreme court
approved of the district court's reversal of the trial court's ruling. The court
then remanded the case for a determination by the trial court, upon a
complete proffer of the FDOT's appraisal expert's testimony, of whether the
evidence is admissible based on the analysis announced in the opinion. 6
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Anstead expressed uncertainty
about the majority's imposition of additional restrictions on evidence of
valuation.87 While Justice Anstead stated that he would answer the
certified question in the affirmative, he also stated he would "leave the
issues of evidence and valuation to be resolved according to prevailing
law. 88
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Relevance of Contamination to Property Value
Article X of the Florida Constitution guarantees that "[n]o private
property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensa-
tion therefor paid to each owner . ,,.9 Full compensation made to the
landowner should be the "fair actual market value at the time of the lawful
83. Id.
84. k
85. Id. at 925 n.1.
86. Id. On remand, the FDOT made its complete proffer, including the testimony of
Edward N. Parker, the FDOT's appraiser, and Douglas R. Ashline, one of the FDOT's
consultant environmental engineers. See Hearing Transcript at 2, 31-99, Department of
Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(19) (Fla. Broward County Ct. Oct. 9, 1995). Following
FDOT's complete proffer and argument by counsel, the trial court denied FDOT's Motion
in Limine and signed a final judgment presented to the court by defense counsel. Id. at 118,
120. Upon making his decision, the trial judge asked FDOT counsel "[y]ou want to take that
up and see what happens on that?" Id. at 120.
87. Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 926 (Anstead, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 6(a).
1996]
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appropriation."'  Fair market value is the amount a willing purchaser,
under no compulsion to buy, would pay for the property. 91 Determining
full compensation, fair market value, and the value of the property taken and
damages 92 to the property remaining, is the primary purpose of an eminent
domain valuation trial.93 Typically, this process involves real estate
appraisers or brokers who give testimony on a variety of factors affecting
value, including the current or potential highest and best use of the property,
90. See Sunday v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 57 So. 351 (Fla. 1912); see also United States
v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1980).
91. See Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972); see also
State Road Dep't v. Stack, 231 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The court in Stack
defines fair market value as the amount of money that a purchaser willing but not obliged
to buy the property would pay an owner willing but not obliged to sell, taking into
consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might be applied in reason. Id.
at 860. The American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, now known as the Appraisal
Institute, defines market value as:
[t]he most probable price in cash, terms equivalent to cash, or in other precisely
revealed terms, for which the appraised property will sell in a competitive market
under all conditions requisite to fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting
prudently, knowledgeably, and for self-interest, and assuming that neither is
under undue duress.
Fundamental assumptions and conditions presumed in this definition are[:]
1. Buyer and seller are motivated by self-interest.
2. Buyer and seller are well informed and are acting prudently.
3. The property is exposed for a reasonable time on the open market.
4. Payment is made in cash, its equivalent, or in specified financing terms.
5. Specified financing, if any, may be the financing actually in place or on
terms generally available for the property type in its locale on the effective
appraisal date.
6. The effect, if any, on the amount of market value of atypical financing,
services, or fees shall be clearly and precisely revealed in the appraisal
report.
The AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, NATIONAL ASS'N OF REALTORS,
THE DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 194-95 (1984) [hereinafter DICrIONARY].
92. See Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1958). "We are persuaded to the view that the facts of this case, viewed in the light of our
constitutional guaranty of full and just compensation, call for a positive assertion of
appellee's right to reasonable compensation for the cost of moving its personal property."
Id. at 292.
93. See FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3).
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population and development trends of the subject neighborhood, and recent
sales of similar property. 94
Eminent domain defense attorneys argue that full compensation is
limitless and, therefore, testimony regarding factors negatively affecting
value necessarily should be restricted. 95 This argument likely stems from
the constitutional protection afforded to landowners from the state's
wrongful exercise of its eminent domain police power.96 Because of these
constitutional guarantees, the supreme court also has been hesitant to place
quantifiable limits on full compensation.97 The supreme court, however,
has held that "[a]lthough fair market value is an important element in the
compensation formula, it is not an exclusive standard in this jurisdiction.
Fair market value is merely a tool to assist us in determining what is full or
just compensation, within the purview of our constitutional requirement.""
In the wake of Finkelstein II, contamination has become another part of the
94. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1987); see
also Boynton v. Canal Auth., 265 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (approving
appraisal testimony based on the "development approach" where appraiser considered profit
ratio, time to sell lots, price of lots, and present value of lots); Division of Admin. State
Dep't of Transp. v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (stating that "value in use" appraisal approach, rather than market valuation predicated
on use for residential purposes, was proper standard of valuation to be used for park
property).
95. See, e.g., Amended Brief of Petitioners at 14-15, Finkelstein (No. 83,308) (stating
that the admission of contamination evidence in condemnation valuation would thwart full
compensation). This argument is based primarily on Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602
(Fla. 1950), which states that the test for full compensation is not met if a landowner is
required to pay attorney fees and costs out of damages awarded for the value of property
taken.
96. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (Due Process Clause) (providing that "[n]o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.. . "). Daniels v. State
Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964), states that the legislature cannot diminish the
concept of full compensation as defined by the courts. The legislature, however, may require
more than the amounts required by judicial interpretation. See also De Soto County v.
Highsmith, 60 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952) (holding that except as limited by the constitution,
proceedings for the acquisition of property by eminent domain shall be prescribed by law).
97. See Daniels, 170 So. 2d at 848 (concluding that both the United States and Florida
Constitutions contain express provisions to safeguard private rights); see also Peavy-Wilson
Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1947) (stating that the unrestrained
power of eminent domain is one of the harshest proceedings practiced in the law).
98. See Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 291
(Fla. 1958); see also Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 897 n.2 (stating "[tlhere is no single test for
determining what is full compensation").
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full compensation formula and a tool by which Florida's definition of full
compensation will be refined.
The starting place for determining full compensation in an eminent
domain valuation proceeding is the appraiser's estimate of fair market
value.99 As stated above, fair market value reflects what willing buyers
and sellers in the market place would pay for the property being ac-
quired."° Numerous factors can affect this willing-buyer-seller test of fair
market value."°' Among them, physical characteristics of the property, use
of the property, recent sales of other similar property, and improvements on
the property are the most recognizable. 2 Until Finkelstein II, however,
the list of judicially-recognized factors in Florida did not include evidence
of contamination, even though buyers, sellers, appraisers, and mortgage
lenders consider this important. 3
As applied to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Florida
rendered a narrow and limited decision in Finkelstein II. The broader
holding, however, is that evidence of contamination is relevant to market
value."' The decision requires condemnors to: 1) meet a factual predi-
cate prior to introducing evidence of value decrease resulting from
contamination;0 5 2) carry the burden of proof on this issue;" and 3)
keep the focus of the eminent domain valuation proceeding on value."
Finally, the decision leaves open questions as to the legal requirements of
the condemnor's appraiser in determining the effect of contamination on
market value.
Applying the law announced in the decision to the facts of the case, the
court specifically limited its holding in Finkelstein H to a site which had
obtained EDI eligibility at the date of taking.0 8 The decision, therefore,
also is necessarily limited to the Finkelstein site, which was in the process
99. Du Pree, 108 So. 2d at 292.
100. See DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 116, 194-95.
101. See William G. Earle et al., Compensation, FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 175, 231-32 (4th ed. 1988) (providing a list of factors affecting the willing
buyer-seller relationship and a list of factors that a willing buyer and seller probably would
consider).
102. Id.
103. See State v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
104. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 1995).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 922-25.
107. Id. at 925.
108. Id.
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of being cleaned."' In Finkelstein II, the parties agreed that the site was
contaminated and was eligible under the EDI program."' Remediation
costs, however, were contested."' Because reimbursement for on-going
remediation was available under the 1990 EDI program,"' the supreme
court found no factual issue regarding contamination and remediation
costs."' The court also reasoned that to prevent the landowner from being
prejudiced by the timing of FDOT's taking (during the clean-up process, for
which the landowner would be reimbursed), the site should be assumed to
be cleaned and valued as such." 4 Based on the facts of the case and the
court's narrow application of the law to the specific facts presented,
Finkelstein II would appear applicable only to sites with EDI eligibility and
on-going remediation at the date of taking.
The broad holding of Finkelstein II, however, is that evidence of
contamination is relevant to value."5 The supreme court limited this
broad holding only when applying it to the facts of this case. 6 Despite
its narrow application here, Finkelstein II has the potential to apply in a
variety of situations: 1) where any type of contaminant is present on a
property; 2) alternate appraisal techniques are applied in valuing contami-
nated property; 3) in non-eminent domain valuation proceedings; and 4)
where no EDI program or reimbursement plan exists. It is this broad
holding regarding Florida valuation law which has the potential to impact
the development of this continually evolving area of law.
The decision imposes a factual predicate on testimony regarding
decrease in property value resulting from contamination.' 17 Though the
factual predicate, reflected in sections 90.704 and 90.705 of the Florida
Statutes, is similar to evidence law throughout the nation,"' the court
articulated that to meet the predicate in this case, the appraiser "must [have]
a factual basis through evidence of sales of comparable contaminated
property upon which to base a determination that contamination has
decreased the value of the property.""' 9 The court then assigned the
109. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
110. Id. at 923.
111. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 2-3, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
112. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
113. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
114. Id. at 925.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 925 n.1.
117. Id. at 922.
118. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704, 705.
119. Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 925.
1996]
15
Sheridan: Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation: The Supreme Court of
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
burden of meeting this evidentiary threshold, in addition to proving decrease
in value, upon the condemnor. 20 Accordingly, the broad holding of
Finkelstein II applies when a party meets the factual predicate set forth by
the court and contained in the Florida Statutes.
The supreme court also stated that, in this case, the condemnor must
prove value decrease based on market data.' Conversely, the condemnee
would have to rebut with proof of no decrease or a lesser decrease,
presumably based on market data.'2 In effect, parties must necessarily
argue about market data and its effect on market value. Though the court
stated that the focus of an eminent domain valuation proceeding must be
value,'2 the court may not have realized the inherent difficulties associat-
ed with locating and analyzing sales of comparable contaminated property
(market data).n 4 As discussed in detail below, the difficulty with the
court's approach is that if sales of contaminated sites are located at all, an
appraiser may not be able to isolate a specific and quantifiable value
decrease based on the data.2' The court's decision, however, also is
broad enough to allow for alternate methods of valuing contaminated
property. These alternate methods would meet the factual predicate
articulated by the supreme court and indicate that contaminated sites, or sites
in the process of being cleaned, sell for less than uncontaminated sites.
Without meeting the factual predicate, however, an appraiser's testimony
would not be admissible. This result is consistent with the evidentiary
threshoid contained in the Florida Statutes, and with Jennings, holding that
all factors relevant to value must be considered.1
2 6
Finally, the decision states that evidence of contamination should not
become a central "feature" of an eminent domain valuation trial.' 7 The
court reasoned that the focus of an eminent domain valuation proceeding is
value.' 2 This rationale is supported by the court's reliance on Jennings.
In Jennings, the supreme court articulated the issue in eminent domain
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla. 1987). The
landowner introduced expert testimony against a condemnor to rebut the condemnor's
representation that potential buyers are knowledgeable about the alleged adverse effects and
would depreciate the land adjacent to a power line before they would buy it. Id.
123. Id.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 265-76.
125. Id.
126. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 899.
127. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 924-25 (Fla. 1995).
128. Id. at 925.
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proceedings is to be full compensation to the landowner for the property
taken. 9 In Jennings, the court disapproved of the landowner's use of
expert witnesses to explain complex scientific evidence about alleged long-
term medical effects from proximity to high-voltage power lines.130 The
court stated that "[a]llowing such scientific testimony into evidence... is
irrelevant to the issue of full compensation."13' The court further stated
that "[t]he introduction into evidence of independent expert's scientific
evidence is ... unnecessary and only serves to confuse the actual issue
before the jury."'32
Based on Jennings, it is reasonable to believe that the court would
similarly disapprove of complicated, technical evidence regarding contami-
nation and cost of remediation in an eminent domain valuation proceeding,
if full compensation and value are the focus of an eminent domain valuation
proceeding."3 It logically follows that the valuation expert (appraiser)
should be the only expert witness required to testify regarding contamina-
tion. In addition, the valuation expert's testimony must necessarily be
limited to the market-based effects of contamination on value, if any."
In this way, the "expert's valuation opinion is based on reasonable factors
[which] may be determined by the jury without resort to other expert
witnesses' testimony or documentary evidence concerning the reasonableness
of the buying public's fears," as held in Jennings.3 The supreme court's
rationale is that this restriction should prevent eminent domain valuation
proceedings from becoming a forum in which to resolve complicated
environmental issues and present lengthy and complex expert testimony,
both of which may be only peripherally related to value or full compensa-
tion. Finally, this limitation reserves for the jury, rather than for technical
experts, the exclusive decision-making power with regard to the effect of
contamination on value,3 6 assuming that a trial court first permits the
testimony.
From the condemnor's perspective, Finkelstein II has the potential to
create conflict with the line of cases where landowners with contaminated
129. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 898.
130. d. at 899.
131. Id. at 897-98.
132. Id. at 899.
133. Id.
134. The Jennings court did not approve of the landowner's scientific experts' testimo-
ny. However, the court accepted the appraiser's testimony. Jennings, 517 So. 2d at 896.
135. Id. at 899.
136. See id. at 899. "We believe that a jury is certainly capable of determining whether
an expert's valuation opinion is reasonable .. " Id.
1996]
17
Sheridan: Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation: The Supreme Court of
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
property seek tax abatement because of the contamination.' 37 For exam-
ple, a landowner may believe that his contaminated property is worth five
dollars per square foot for tax purposes. Were this same landowner to
become a condemnee, however, it is possible that the owner could assert
that based on Finkelstein II, the property should be valued as if cleaned at
fifteen dollars per square foot, leaving the condemnor to pay the clean-up
bill. Because the taxing authority and the condemnor likely are not the
same entity, 13 there is the potential for a landowner-turned-condemnee to
"double-dip" and gain an incongruous advantage (or a fuller measure of
compensation) in the combined tax abatement/condemnation situation.
Almost all condemnees are taxpayers. 39 The converse, however, is not
true. To prevent this result, Finkelstein II must necessarily cross litigation
boundaries and be given full precedental effect in all types of valuation
proceedings, including tax abatement cases.
Finkelstein II also encourages landowners of contaminated property to
begin remediation quickly to gain the advantage of the decision, should they
become a condemnee. For instance, if a landowner of contaminated
property immediately begins environmental assessment or remediation and
subsequently becomes a condemnee, it is likely that courts would find a
factual similarity with, and therefore, reason to apply, Finkelstein I."4°
The decision, however, does not state in what stage of the remediation
process the site must be to gain this valuation advantage. For example, the
landowners of the Finkelstein site had "begun remediation" at the date of the
taking.141 It is uncertain as to how far into the remediation process the
137. See, e.g., Robert I. McMurry, Treatment of Environmental Contamination in
Eminent Domain Cases, C975 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 237, 251-53 (1995), available in WL, TP-ALL
Directory, ALI-ABA Database [hereinafter McMurry, Treatment] (presenting case law and
an analysis of valuing contaminated property for tax purposes with an extensive bibliogra-
phy); see also University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1993).
138. In Florida, the Department of Transportation is authorized to condemn property to
widen state roads. FLA. STAT. chs. 73, 74, 334-39 (1995). County government is responsible
for real estate taxation.
139. It is generally known that examples of tax-exempt owners are not-for-profit
corporations, charitable organizations, property owned by the state, county, or city, churches,
libraries, and schools, and other public buildings.
140. Finkelstein I held that because clean-up on the site was under way at the date of
taking, the site should be valued as if the clean-up were completed. Finkelstein II, 656 So.
2d 921, 925 (Fla. 1995).
141. Interview with Linda Ferroli Nelson, supra note 31; see also supra text
accompanying note 26.
[Vol. 20
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/13
Sheridan
site was at the date of the taking.142 Conversely, if a landowner in a
similar factual setting had not begun remediation prior to the taking, it is
likely that the Finkelstein II decision would require denial of a landowner's
request to limit expert testimony on the effect of contamination on the value
of the site.
The Finkelstein II decision also leaves open several other avenues for
broader application. It would be reasonable for the decision to apply in
cases where sites suffer from contamination other than underground
petroleum hydrocarbon. Because of the court's reliance on Jennings, it is
possible that Finkelstein II could apply in cases litigating the value of sites
contiguous to contaminated sites, but which may not themselves be
contaminated. 43 This also seems reasonable considering the court's
reference to "stigma" created by the increased risk associated with
contaminated property. 144 Appraisal professionals generally agree that
stigma accrues to property that adjoins contaminated property, as well as to
the contaminated property itself.145 Finally, because value is the focus of
any type of valuation proceeding, evidence of contamination also would be
relevant in non-eminent domain valuation proceedings.
This is as far as the Supreme Court of Florida has gone. Until recently,
little, if any, case law on this issue had emerged nationwide. Like
Finkelstein II, however, a handful of courts in other states recently have held
that evidence of contamination is relevant to market value." 6 These cases
142. See supra text accompanying note 26.
143. See Lorraine Lewandrowski, Toxic Blackacre: Appraisal Techniques & Current
Trends in Valuation, 5 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 55, 87-92 (1994), available in WL, TP-ALL
Directory, JLR Database (discussing valuation techniques applicable to property near or
adjacent to contaminated sites).
144. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
145. See Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 89; see also Howard R. Cabot, Post-
Remediation 'Stigma' Damages Hinge on Hard Evidence of Residual Risk, INsIDE LrIG.,
Oct. 1994, at 28, available in WL, Law Reviews, Legal Texts and Periodicals Directory,
Journals and Law Reviews Database; Arnold, supra note 9, at 415-16.
146. See Redevelopment Agency v. Thrifty Oil Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that evidence of contamination is just one of many factors that jury may consider
in determining fair market value in eminent domain proceeding); Murphy v. Town of Water-
ford, No. 520173, 1992 WL 170588, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 9, 1992) (holding that
locality cannot reduce amount payable to landowner as just compensation for taking for
cleanup expenses, because Connecticut statute provides for reimbursement of such expenses);
Department of Transp. ex rel. People v. Parr, 633 N.E.2d 19 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (holding
that state may not introduce cost required to remediate contaminated property in eminent
domain proceeding because such costs are not condition influencing property's value); City
of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993) (holding that in eminent domain proceeding,
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are similar to Finkelstein II in that each involved condemnation of
contaminated property where the court addressed the question of whether
evidence of contamination was relevant to value. 47 Of these few cases,
those involving mass acquisition of uranium mines,148 as well as tax
abatement cases,149 are not as analogous to Finkelstein II as are the
following cases. Though considering the broad holding of Finkelstein II, the
factually distinguishable uranium mine and tax abatement cases provide a
valuable comparative source for case law addressing collateral issues such
as appropriate and/or admissible appraisal methodology. 5
In State v. Brandon,' the issue before the court was whether
evidence of contamination and remediation costs were relevant in determin-
ing the fair market value of a property being acquired under eminent
domain.'52 The Tennessee appellate court held that evidence of contami-
nation and the cost to remediate it was relevant in determining the fair
market value of a property being acquired under eminent domain. 53
The Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT"') acquired a
portion of a bulk oil distributorship and gasoline service station in December
1991 .'" After the court transferred title to the state, the state's contractor
found underground petroleum hydrocarbon contamination.'55 Between
evidence of contamination is admissible for purpose of determining fair market value); State
v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that trial court erroneously
excluded environmental contamination evidence which was relevant to issue of valuation in
eminent domain proceeding). All of these cases involve condemnation of contaminated
property where relevance of evidence of contamination was questioned.
147. See cases cited supra note 146.
148. See, e.g., Department of Health v. Hecla Mining Co., 781 P.2d 122 (Colo. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that jury may consider present and future use and condition of condemned
land for purpose of determining value after state has exercised its power of eminent domain
pursuant to Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act); see also State Dep't of Health v.
The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2612 (1995).
149. See McMurry, Treatment, supra note 137, at 251-53.
150. See, e.g., Westling v. Mille Lacs, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-94-379-R, C9-94-380-R,
C5-93-706-R, 1995 WL 128511, at *2-*3 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), aff'd, 1996 WL
39626 (Minn. 1996) (holding that value of property for tax assessment purposes should
account for negative "stigma" which attaches to previously contaminated property);
University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1993).
151. 898 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
152. Id. at 225.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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January and April 1992, the state began to remediate the site.1 56 In June
1992, the property owner was notified by TDOT of the contamination and
was ordered to conduct additional pollution surveying and abatement proce-
dures. 57 The landowners denied the existence of contamination and did
not acquiesce to the state's demands to clean up the site. 151 The state
subsequently completed the contamination remediation, at a total cost of
$64,525.58.' Acting on the motion of the landowners, the trial court
ordered the state, its attorneys, and expert witnesses, not to mention at trial
the existence of the contamination nor to reveal the cost of remediation.' 60
The valuation experts were forced to testify on the value of the land as if it
was uncontaminated.6  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
landowners. 62 After the jury retired, TDOT attempted to proffer evidence
concerning the contamination on the property and the cost of remedia-
tion.163 The court stated that the proffer could be made at a later date."6
TDOT then filed a Motion for Remittitur, or offset of remediation costs
against the verdict and requested a new trial. 65 The trial court denied the
motions and TDOT appealed. 1'
Relying on the Tennessee Rules of Evidence,'67 which state that
relevant evidence is generally admissible, 6 1 the court held that the
contaminated nature of the property is relevant to the issue of valuation
because it tends to make a lower market value more probable than it would
without the evidence.' 69 The court also reasoned that the form of proper-
ty, or a property characteristic, is relevant to valuation. 70 In reviewing
the facts of the case, the court looked to the testimony of two experts.' 7'
An affidavit from a banker stated that banks generally will not finance
156. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 225.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 225-26.
167. See TENN. R. EVID. 401, 403.
168. Id.
169. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 227.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 226-27.
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contaminated property or take back contaminated property, and that the
subject site was the type of site which typically required an environmental
assessment.'72 Similarly, the appraiser stated in an affidavit that some
offset for remediation was required and that stigma was the detrimental
effect of contamination on property value. 7 3  The court finally found
support for its decision based on three cases from other jurisdictions,174
including Finkelstein L 7' In applying the law to the facts, the court found
evidence of contamination relevant, but rejected a pure "1 to 1 offset" of
remediation costs to land value.
17 6
Brandon is consistent with Finkelstein II. However, Brandon is
broader than Finkelstein II because it holds remediation costs, in addition to
evidence of contamination, to be relevant to value." The case is distin-
guishable on its facts because in Brandon, the contamination was not known
at the date of the taking. 7 s However, the balance of the factual circum-
stance is strikingly similar. Also, by relying on Tennessee evidence rules
and case law, 179 the court's reasoning is similar to that utilized in Finkel-
stein II. At the time briefs for Finkelstein II were submitted to the Supreme
Court of Florida,80 Brandon had not yet been decided.' If it had, it
is likely that the Tennessee decision would have bolstered the FDOT's
position in Finkelstein I.
Likewise, the issue presented in Department of Transportation ex rel.
People v. Parr,82 also was whether evidence of contamination and
remediation costs are relevant in determining the fair market value of a
property being acquired under eminent domain.8 3 However, the Illinois
appellate court held that under the facts of the case, evidence of contamina-
172. Id. at 226.
173. Id. at 226-27.
174. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 227.
175. 629 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
176. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 228.
177. Id. at 226-28.
178. Id. at 225.
179. Id. at 225-28.
180. The Amended Brief of Petitioners was submitted July 7, 1994 and Respondent's
Brief was submitted July 26, 1994. See Amended Brief of Petitioners at 30, Finkelstein (No.
83,308); Brief for Respondent at 25, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
181. Brandon was decided on December 30, 1994. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 224.
182. 633 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
183. Id. at 21.
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tion and the cost to remediate was not relevant to the fair market value of
a property being acquired.'
At the same time that the Illinois Department of Transportation
("IDOT") notified the landowner that his property would be required to
construct a bridge, IDOT informed the owner that he owed $100,000 for the
property's environmental remediation costs."' Subsequently, IDOT filed
a complaint to condemn the property via Illinois' "quick-take' statute.8 6
At the quick-take bench trial, IDOT presented evidence that the property's
value was zero due to the alleged presence of contamination and because of
remediation costs."s The court awarded possession of the site to
IDOT.' Pursuant to the Illinois "quick-take" law, the court's written
order following the trial stated that evidence of environmental contamination
was not admissible in an eminent domain proceeding.8 9 The trial court
further found that IDOT failed to prove the existence of an "unsafe or
unlawful condition" on the property, according to Illinois law."9 IDOT
undertook to remediate the site. 9' At the valuation trial, the landowners
filed a motion to bar all testimony concerning environmental contamina-
tion."g The trial court held a hearing and ordered the parties to submit
briefs and argument addressing: 1) whether evidence of environmental
contamination and remediation costs was admissible; and 2) whether such
evidence would implicate the landowner's procedural due process rights. 93
After both parties submitted briefs, the trial court granted the landowner's
Motion to Bar Testimony on Contamination and Remediation194 The trial
court certified the question to the Illinois appellate court. IDOT filed a
Motion for Leave to Appeal. 195 The appellate court granted IDOT's mo-
tion. 196
184. Id.
185. Id. at 20.
186. Id. The "quick-take" statute described is similar to that outlined in chapter 74 of
the Florida Statutes, where a condemnor may take property under an expedited, or shortened,
schedule.
187. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 20.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 21. The court refers to § 7-119 of the Illinois Eminent Domain Act.
191. Id.
192. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 21.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Though the court in Parr held that, based on the facts of the case,
evidence of contamination was not relevant to value,197 Parr also is
consistent with Finkelstein H. If the IDOT had proved that the contamina-
tion constituted an illegal condition affecting the value of the property, it is
likely that the court would have found the contamination relevant to
value, 98 in accord with Illinois' Eminent Domain Act.199 Similarly, the
Illinois court held that without proving the existence of the illegal condition
(contamination), evidence of remediation costs also was not relevant to
value.' ° This is not unlike the holding in Finkelstein H that because the
site was eligible for EDI reimbursement, evidence of remediation cost also
was not admissible."z ' The Illinois court, however, took this rationale a
step further. It declared that evidence of remediation costs, if admissible in
this case, would violate the procedural due process rights of the landowner
because IDOT did not follow the procedural safeguards set forth in the
Environmental Protection Act. 2 Specifically, DOT failed to notify the
landowner of the nature or extent of the environmental hazard on the
property. 3 IDOT also failed to inform the landowner that it sought to
hold them liable for remediation costs. 204 Because of these failures, the
landowner's procedural due process claim succeeded.205 Such a claim
would not have been viable in Finkelstein H because the tenant was aware
of the contamination and had taken steps to remediate it prior to the
taking.206 Aside from this constitutional claim, Parr also stands for the
197. 633 N.E.2d at 21.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 21-22 (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/7-119 (West 1992)).
Paragraph 5/7-119 provides that:
[e]vidence is admissible as to . . . (2) any unsafe, unsanitary, substandard, or
illegal condition, use or occupancy of the property;... and (4) the reasonable
cost of causing the property to be placed in a legal condition, use or occupancy.
Such evidence is admissible notwithstanding the absence of any official action
taken to require the correction or abatement of such illegal condition, use or
occupancy.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/7-119.
200. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 22.
201. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 922-24.
202. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 22-23.
203. Id. at 23.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1995); Amended Brief of Petitioners
at 1, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Interview with Linda Ferroli Nelson, supra note 31.
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proposition that given the correct evidentiary predicate, evidence of
contamination would be relevant to value.
A third case, similar to Finkelstein II, was rendered by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in City of Olathe v. Stott.2 7 Like Finkelstein II, the court
in Stott considered the relevance of contamination to value and, also like
Finkelstein II, concluded that the Kansas underground storage tank
reimbursement program did not prohibit evidence of the effect that
contamination and stigma had on the subject property's value. °3
In mid-1990, the city of Olathe, Kansas condemned eight tracts of land
to expand the intersection at 119th Street and Interstate 352' Two of the
tracts had been operated as service stations for twenty-five years.210 Each
site had leaking underground gasoline and diesel fuel storage tanks.2 1 At
the eminent domain valuation trial, the appraisers for the city were allowed,
over the landowners' objections, to testify to the impact of the contamina-
tion on value.2 2 The landowners sought to introduce testimony that on
previous occasions, the city had acquired contaminated sites without
investigating the contamination.2 13 The landowners also proffered testimo-
ny to impeach the credibility of the city's appraisers."4 The trial court
ruled that the landowners' evidence was not admissible because it was not
relevant.21s After the trial was concluded, the court inquired of the jury
about how it considered the evidence of the contamination in reaching its
verdict.216 The juror who responded indicated that the jury did, in fact,
consider the contamination and that it reduced the property's value by ten
percent.217 The landowners appealed claiming that the trial court erred by
excluding their proffered testimony and by inquiring of the jury.218
The pertinent part of the decision presents a detailed look at the Kansas
Storage Tank Act ("Act"), 219 which is similar in structure to Florida's EDI
207. 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993).
208. Id. at 1289.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1289.
213. Id. at 1290.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1290.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1289-93 (citing IAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-34,100 to 65-34,212 (1993)).
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program.22° In brief, the Act provides for reimbursement of remediation
costs for qualified sites.2 ' The landowners' primary argument was that
the Act preempted all other law that might address funding the clean-up
costs required from the contamination.22 In addition, the landowners
argued that because of the Act, the impact of contamination on property
value should not be an issue in an eminent domain valuation proceed-
ing.2 The court, however, sided with the city, stating that the Act did
not specifically address reduction in property value attributable to risk or
stigma associated with contamination."2 4 Furthermore, the court held that
the Act did not address what appeared to be primarily a cost issue--the
reduction in value attributable to risk and stigma associated with the
contamination.225 The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting the appraisers' testimony that risk and stigma
associated with the contamination had a negative effect on the properties'
value because their opinion was formed over time after market investiga-
tion.26
The reasoning used in Stott is strikingly similar to that found in
Finkelstein H. In effect, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the EDI
program, like the Kansas Storage Tank Act, did not provide the only remedy
for matters associated with on-site contamination and that any consideration
of the issue is otherwise improper in an eminent domain valuation
proceeding. 7 Like the Florida court, the Supreme Court of Kansas also
recognized that a negative stigma attaches to property even after it has been
cleaned.' Consideration of this issue in an eminent domain valuation
proceeding, as noted by both courts, is proper because stigma has a direct
bearing on, and is relevant to, property value.229 Finally, it is interesting
to note that the Stott decision was available to the Supreme Court of Florida
at the time its decision in Finkelstein H was rendered. 3' The Stott
decision, despite its similarities, is not mentioned in the Finkelstein H
220. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
221. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1290-93.
222. Id. at 1292.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1293.
226. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1298.
227. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1995).
228. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1293-98.
229. Id.; Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
230. Stott was decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas on October 29, 1993. Stott, 861
P.2d at 1287.
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decision, however. Perhaps the Supreme Court of Florida was not
compelled to place reliance on Stott, particularly because of the availability
and applicability of Jennings, a Florida case.
Finally, a California Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in
Redevelopment Agency v. Thrifly Oil Co.23' The claim arose in an
eminent domain proceeding involving the condemnation of a petroleum
hydrocarbon contaminated gasoline service station 32 In recognizing that
evidence of contamination is relevant to value, the court rejected the
condemnee's contention that remediation costs were not properly before the
jury.233 The court stated that contamination was considered by all experts
in determining the fair market value of the property acquired.3 The court
in Thrifty, unlike the court in Finkelstein II, also stated that remediation was
a characteristic of the property which would affect its value. 5 Despite
the broader holding in Thrifty, the thrust of the decision is quite similar to
and supportive of the reasoning announced in Finkelstein IL
Because only a handful of cases of this type exist, it would be
somewhat premature to state that a trend in the law has developed. It is
possible, however, to draw several distinct conclusions from a comparison
of these cases. First, most courts seemed willing to recognize that given the
proper factual predicate, evidence of contamination is relevant to value3 6
This evidence, in the form of a properly-qualified appraiser's testimony,
could include the risk and stigma associated with the contamination" 7 and
remediation costs where a plan of clean-up was not already under way or
completed3 8  Second, it is apparent that courts favor a "back-door"
approach to admitting evidence of the effect of contamination on property
value. In each case, the evidence sought to be admitted came from a
valuation expert, not a contamination or environmental expert.3 9 Accord-
ingly, the relevant factors related to the contamination and effecting market
231. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1992).
232. Id. at 688.
233. Id. at 689 n.9.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1995); Thrifty, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
689; State v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 224 Cenn. Ct. App. 1994). But see Department of
Transp. ex rel. People v. Parr, 633 N.E.2d 19, 22 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
237. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925; Thrifty, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689; Brandon, 898
S.W.2d at 225. These cases describe factors which generally make up stigma.
238. See Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 924; Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 21-23.
239. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924; Thrifty, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689; Brandon, 898
S.W.2d at 226; Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 20.
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value should be addressed by a single valuation witness, such as an
appraiser testifying on the question of "stigma." In this way, eminent
domain valuation proceedings also do not become environmental trials. By
following the courts' suggestions, a host of environmental technicians and
expert witnesses would not dominate the trial, prejudice the defendant,2'
or confuse the jury.24 1 Finally, those courts which have admitted evidence
of remediation cost, have also disfavored "l-to-l" remediation cost to value
set-offs.z4 Presumably, if an appraiser employs a valuation approach
considering "stigma,"243 the problem of a "1-to-l" set off can be avoided.
Finkelstein II declares that evidence of contamination is relevant to
value.'" Though the decision seems to be limited to the facts of the case,
its broader holding should apply to the many situations where contamination
and value intersect. The decision also is consistent with case law in other
jurisdictions. Finally, Finkelstein II suggests a plan by which a condemnor
may litigate both issues without prejudicing the defendant and without
creating a highly technical environmental proceeding with the potential to
confuse the jury.
B. Methods of Valuing Contaminated Property
The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the issue of valuing contami-
nated property has been the subject of much recent discussion within the
appraisal profession.4 Particularly, the court noted that these sources
recognize contamination as a factor considered by appraisers.2' The court
did not, however, stop at merely recognizing that the appraisal profession
is developing techniques by which appraisers may estimate the value of
contaminated property. In applying the law to the facts of the case, the
court stated, based on Florida evidence law,247 that a proper factual basis
on which to base an opinion of the effect of contamination on property
240. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925 (stating that evidence of contamination, by its
nature, is prejudicial).
241. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987).
242. See Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 226; see also University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City
of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J.
1993); Inmar Assoc., Inc. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 549 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1988); see generally
McGregor, supra note 9.
243. See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
244. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 922.
245. Id. at 923.
246. Id.
247. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.703, .705 (1995).
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value is through reliance on evidence of sales of comparable contaminated
property.24 Based on the court's statement, it would seem that such an
approach is only one method of valuing contaminated property. Since the
late 1980s, new approaches to valuing contaminated property have emerged
from within the appraisal community. Prior to discussing these new
approaches to valuing contaminated property, however, a brief discussion of
general appraisal practice is appropriate.
The Unifonn Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice requires
appraisers to consider the three traditional approaches to valuing proper-
ty. 9 These approaches are the cost approach, the income approach, and
the market or sales comparison approach.2" The outcome of each
approach is weighed by the appraiser when making her final estimate of
market value.251
The cost approach is a specialized set of procedures in which an
appraiser derives a value indication by estimating the current cost to
reproduce or replace the existing structure, deducting for all accrued
depreciation in the property, and adding the estimated land value. 2 The
cost approach is particularly useful in valuing new or nearly new improve-
ments and properties that are not frequently exchanged in the market. 3
Specialty properties, like gasoline service stations, are particularly suited to
being valued by the cost approach because of the absence of a significant
market and comparable sales data.' In developing the cost approach for
a Finkelstein-like site, the appraiser would be required to locate sales of
comparable contaminated vacant land.2 55 The appraiser also must develop
248. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
249. UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACrIcE 13-15 (Appraisal
Foundation ed., 1995). Rule 1-4 sets forth the standards.
250. APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 71 (10th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter APPRAISAL TEXT].
251. Id. at 553-60.
252. See DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 75.
253. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 80. Gasoline service stations are
generally considered to be "special purpose" properties. Special use properties, or limited
market properties, are properties that are not frequently exchanged in the market because of
unique physical design, special construction materials, specialized use improvements, or
layouts that restrict their utility to the use for which they were originally built. Id. at 21; see
also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 366 N.E.2d 808, 811 (N.Y. 1977) (holding
that special purpose properties are those which are uniquely adapted to business conducted
upon them, or use made of them, and cannot be converted to other uses without expenditure
of substantial sums of money); Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 59.
254. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 23.
255. See id. at 298-310 (discurssing land valuation techniques).
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a market-based rate of depreciation for any improvements on the proper-
ty. 6 If the appraiser cannot locate comparable sales, she would have to
employ an alternate appraisal method257 which, if speculative or un-
tried" within the professional appraisal community, may not satisfy the
proper factual predicate.
The income approach is a set of procedures which an appraiser uses to
derive a value indication for income-producing property by converting
anticipated income benefits into an indication of present value. 59 Specifi-
cally, an indication of value is derived by capitalizing the property's net
income based on a market-derived overall capitalization rate, which
considers the risk associated with the investment.260 For contaminated
property, the income approach should consider factors including: 1) the
extent and nature of the contamination, which may result in unmarketability
or reduced marketability; 2) the type of contaminated property involved; 3)
the presence of assumable financing; and 4) demand for alternative uses.26'
Most appraisal methodologists agree that the presence of contamination
increases the risk associated with an investment-type, income-producing
property.262  Increased risk typically translates into less value. 63  In
addition, factors including remediation costs, lost rental or investment
256. Id. at 243-65.
257. See, for example, Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, which presents three different
approaches to valuing contaminated property and frequently recognized as the seminal article
addressing valuation of contaminated property. See also Peter J. Patchin, Contaminated
Properties-Stigma Revisited, 59 APPRAISAL J. 167 (1991) [hereinafter Patchin, Stigma
Revisited] (continuing the development of innovative valuation analyses and techniques).
258. See Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, New Developments for Environmental
Practitioners in Hazardous Materials Litigation, C750 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 343, 371-73 (1992),
available in WL, TP-ALL Directory, ALI-ABA Database [hereinafter McMurry & Pierce,
New Developments]; Anthony J. Rinaldi, Contaminated Properties-Valuation Solutions, 59
APPRAISAL J. 377 (1991). But see Westling v. Mille Lacs County, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-
94-379-R, C9-94-380-R, C5-93-706-R, 1995 WL 128511, at *1 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17,
1995), afftd, 1996 WL 39626 (Minn. 1996) (approving of an appraiser's use of the cost,
market, and income approaches to reach correlated opinions of "unimpaired value," then
deducting a stigma factor and cost to cure from the unimpaired values to reach final
conclusions of market value).
259. See DICIONARY, supra note 91, at 159.
260. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 409.
261. See Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 60-61.
262. See, e.g., Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 13 (advancing modified income
capitalization method as most reliable approach to valuation of contaminated investment
properties).
263. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 415-19.
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income, and "down time" during clean-up, also can negatively impact on an
income stream and translate into less value.' 6
The market approach, or sales comparison approach, is a set of
procedures by which an appraiser derives a value indication by comparing
the property being appraised to similar properties that have recently been
sold.26 The appraiser then analyzes the appropriate units of comparison,
and makes adjustments, based on the elements of comparison, to the sales
prices of the comparable sales.26 An appraiser considers factors including
property rights conveyed, financing terms, conditions of sale, market
conditions, location, physical characteristics, economic characteristics, use,
and other non-realty components of the sale price.267 The sales compari-
son approach is particularly appropriate and persuasive when sufficient
market data, or recent sales of similar properties exist.2 6 This approach,
however, is rarely applied to specialty properties, such as gasoline service
stations, because few similar properties may be sold in a given market, even
one that is geographically broad.269 In such a case, the market approach
may establish only a broad limit for the value of the property being
appraised and help to verify the findings of the other approaches to
value.2 70
Most appraisal methodologists agree that the market approach has
limitations which render it virtually ineffective when appraising contami-
nated property. 7 The ineffectiveness of this approach primarily arises
due to the lack of market data.2 Because the nature and extent of
contamination on a property is unique to that parcel, it is all but impossible
264. Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 11-13.
265. See DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 268; D'Elia & Ward, supra note 9, at 357.
266. See APPRAISAL TExT, supra note 250, at 371.
267. See id. at 367.
268. Id. at 368-69; see also Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 63.
269. Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 63.
270. Id.
271. See D'Elia & Ward, supra note 9, at 359; McMurry, Treatment, supra note 137,
at 249 (discussing petroleum contaminated properties); Arnold, supra note 9, at 418; Robert
I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, Environmental Contamination and its Effect on Eminent
Domain, C791 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 133, 162 (1993); McMurry & Pierce, New Developments, supra
note 258, at 343; Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, Environmental Remediation and
Eminent Domain, C709 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 105, 135 (1992), available in WL, TP-ALL Directory,
ALI-ABA Database.
272. APPRAISAL TExT, supra note 250, at 368-69; see also Lewandrowski, supra note
143, at 63; Chalmers & Roehr, supra note 65, at 36. But see McMurry, Treatment, supra
note 137, at 249 (indicating that some appraisers have had success with appraising petroleum
contaminated sites because such contamination is so common among the property type).
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to locate sales of property similarly contaminated.273 In addition, because
the degree and nature of contamination is unique to each property, it also is
difficult to compare remediation plans and costs.274 Similarly, the owner's
liability stemming from the contamination may vary from site to site,
thereby making unit to unit comparison virtually impossible. 75 Even if
market data exist, the amount of adjustment required to make a sale of
contaminated property similar to the contaminated property being appraised
may make any value indication highly speculative.276
Since the Finkelstein case was first litigated, advances in appraisal
methodology have lead to the development of several new and innovative
approaches to appraising contaminated property.2' The income approach
is particularly well-suited to modification for use in valuing contaminated
property. Once the income stream to the property is estimated, a complex
series of mathematical calculations and income valuation models may be
employed. Because of the appraiser's ability to more realistically and
accurately quantify the effects of contamination through these models, the
most promising advances in appraisal theory in regard to appraising
contaminated property have developed here. At best, these new models are
complex, intricate, and likely difficult for the average juror to understand.
Though these methods are gaining industry approval, courts are likely to
disfavor them as being complicated and too technical.
273. See Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 63. On remand, the FDOT made its
complete proffer, including the testimony of Edward N. Parker, MAI, the FDOT's appraiser.
See Hearing Transcript at 48-99, Department of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(19)
(Fla. Broward County Ct. Oct. 9, 1995). During FDOT's proffer, Mr. Parker testified to the
information and data available to him since the time of trial and at the time of the hearing.
Id. at 49. As to market data found after the trial, Mr. Parker discovered only seven case
studies of Florida properties which were either contaminated or in the process of clean-up
at the time of sale. Id. at 70 (case studies on file with author). Mr. Parker also testified to
the extreme difficulty and time consuming process involved in locating this type of market
data. Id. at 66, 69. The data indicated that "stigma" attaching to contaminated property
ranged from 26 to 94%. Id. at 68.
274. See Arnold, supra note 9, at 418.
275. See Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 10-12.
276. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 373-74.
277. See, e.g., Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9; Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 74-88
(describing the application to contaminated properties of such valuation techniques as future
benefit analysis, discounted cash flow method, modified income approach, discounting for
remediation costs, nominal value to site, and sales method); Rinaldi, supra note 258, at 377
(asserting as preferable a form of depreciation which involves appraisal of property as if
uncontaminated, followed by appraisal which accounts for existence of contamination).
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One of these new valuation approaches is a modified version of the
income approach. The approach adjusts the overall capitalization rate to
reflect higher risk associated with the contaminated site.27 The higher
capitalization rate, when applied to the property's income stream, indicates
a lower overall value.2 79 Another method, proposed by the same appraisal
theorist, is to appraise the property as clean, then re-appraise it as dirty, and
subtract the value indication of the latter from the former for an indication
of damages to the property resulting from the contamination and clean-up
costs.280 Yet another approach is based on the premise that the contamina-
tion changes the highest and best use of the site, thereby resulting in
reduced value."' Despite the emergence of these new methods, the
appraisal community, as well as the courts, continues to struggle to find a
way to quantify the effect that contamination has on market value.2
Perhaps the most frequently approved means of quantifying this effect
is through testimony of "stigma." '283 Stigma has been defined as the
impact on property value stemming from the increased risk associated with
the property and the effect of this risk on marketability and financeabil-
ity.28 4 One author suggests that stigma contains seven elements including
disruption, concealability, aesthetic effect, responsibility, prognosis, degree
of peril, and level of fear.28 5 This author also suggests that these seven
278. Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 13-14; see also Chalmers & Roehr, supra note
65. But see University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1993) (disapproving of a landowner's
appraiser's use of a discounted cash flow valuation technique). For another article discussing
this topic see Richard A. Newstein, Estimating Value Diminution by the Income Approach,
60 APPRAISAL J. 293 (1992).
279. Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9 at 13-14.
280. Id. at 14.
281. Id.
282. See generally D'Elia & Ward, supra note 9.
283. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1995); see also Westling v. Mille
Lacs, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-94-379-R, C9-94-380-R, C5-93-706-R, 1995 WL 128511, at *1
(Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), aff'd, 1996 WL 39626 (Minn. 1996) (approving of
appraiser's testimony that stigma associated with the contamination had a negative effect on
property value); City of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993). See generally D'Elia
& Ward, supra note 9 (stating that judicial recognition of reductions in market value because
of the existence of contamination has been slow in coming).
284. Chalmers & Roehr, supra note 65; see also Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft General
Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Patricia R. Healy & John J. Healy, Jr.,
Lenders' Perspectives on Environmental Issues, 60 APPRAISAL J. 397 (1992).
285. Bill Mundy, Stigma and Value, 60 APPRAISAL J. 7 (1992).
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criteria are used to evaluate and determine the degree of stigma. 86
Determining stigma, however, ultimately boils down to extensive research
because appraisers will seldom find this type of market data in recorded
transactions. 28' Not only does stigma attach to property that is contami-
nated, appraisers now contend that stigma also remains after the property has
been cleaned.288 Despite the difficulties inherent in quantifying stigma in
the marketplace, courts seem willing to accept testimony regarding stigma
if the appraiser supports an estimate of stigma based on reasonable appraisal
methodology, including the methodology outlined above.2 89 In addition,
the logical simplicity of the "stigma approach" may make it more attractive
and appeal to both judges and jurors who likely are unfamiliar and
uncomfortable with complicated and highly technical valuation techniques.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida held in FinkeIstein II that evidence of
contamination is relevant to market value. At first glance, the decision
appears to be limited to eminent domain valuation proceedings in which the
value of whole takings of contaminated sites with EDI eligibility is
determined. Finkelstein II, however, presents a broader holding that
transcends the factual limitations of the case. The decision expands the list
of factors admissible when valuing all types of contaminated property. The
decision is consistent with Florida case law and the law developing in other
jurisdictions. Finally, the decision also suggests a means through which
testimony regarding the negative effect of contamination on property value
may be presented.
Evidence of contamination has only just begun to make its way into the
courtroom. In the future, appraisers, attorneys, and courts will continue to
struggle with this topic. Though Finkelstein II may appear to be a small
286. Id. at 9.
287. Patchin, Stigma Revisited, supra note 257, at 172.
288. See Cabot, supra note 145, at 27; see also Bradford D. Roth & Neville M. Bili-
moria, "Post-Cleanup Stigma" Claims: It Can Happen to You, ENVTL. PROTECriON, June
1995, at 52.
289. See Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); Westling v. Mille Lacs, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-94-379-R, C9-94-380-R, C5-93-706-R,
1995 WL 128511, at *1 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), aff'd, 1996 WL 39626 (Minn. 1996);
City of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993); see also James D. Masterman, Opinion
Testimony in Eminent Domain Trials, C975 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 87 (1995), available in WL, TP-
ALL Directory, ALI-ABA Database (listing other cases in which appraiser testified regarding
stigma).
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step toward resolving the countless issues this type of litigation raises, it is
a measured step in the right direction. It is logical to hold that evidence of
contamination is relevant to value. Future decisions should begin to clarify
this general logical basis and provide the legal and appraisal communities
with specific guidance on this important, emerging area of law.
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